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STOCK MARKET REACTION
TO SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL MERGERS
Antony C. Cherin
and
Michael Hergen

Can investors assess the probability of success for a new merger? There have
been numerous studies of the determinants of merger success and market reaction to merger announcements. However. there has been no systematic analysis
of how well the stock market can anticipate 5uccessful or poor mergers at the
time of their inception. Such recognition should be revealed in the stock market
returns of the firms involved at the time of the merger announcement. It is common practice for the business media to report the share price movements in
response to a merger announcement. However. the interpretation of these price
movements re{juires caution. The change in market values in response to a merger
announcement will reflect both the expected value creation (or destruction)
resulting from the merger as well a~ the distribution of the gains (or losses) from
the negotiation process between the two firm~. Prev1ou5 research into market
response to merger announcements suggest5 that most of the value created through
merger is likely to be captured by the acquired firm's shareholders. However.
the amount of value created. regardless of its distribution. should reflect the
market's best guess about the future prospet·ts for the combined entity.
Thi~ study examines the market'5 spontaneous ability to make such an assessment. The ultimate succes5 or failure of a merger will depend on a variety of
factors, some of which arc unfore5eeable at the time of the announcement. There
are four broad categories of sources of failure to consider. First. the merger may
be strategically unsound . The partner~ may have no dear basis for synergy or
compelling advantage from combined operation. Second, the merger may be forced
to operate in a hostile economic environment. A downturn in the busines5 cycle
may make a potentially workable merger prove un~uccessful. Third. random events
may occur which jeopardize the merger . A key executive of one partner may
leave, a tt:chnological breakthrough may occur benefiting a rival, or labor problems may emerge. Finally, the managment of 1he post-merger process may be
deficient. For example, it is difficult to integrale two disparate organization~ into
a single cohesive unit. Corporate culture~ may clash. management policies may
contradict. and a variety of problems may arise in consolidating the two firms.
The vast majority of research into market efficiency suggests that the market
is reasonably efficient at valuing securities on the basis of all available information. Howeve r, the last three sources of merger failure cited above reflect information which will be unavailable to the market at the time of 1he announcement.
Nonetheless. the market should be able to make some assessmenl of the strategic
fit between merger partners. In the extreme cases of the decade's best and worst
mergers, one may expect that a significanlly different reaction to merger announcements would be observed. This article describes an experiment to test this
hypothesis.
The literature regarding acquisition activity is both broad and rich. Studies by
Mandeleker (16), Langetieg (15], and Dodd (6J, as well as other work surveyed
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by Mueller [ 17), suggest that stockholders of acquired firms benefit while those
of acquiring firms roughly break even. This result is funher supported by the
findings of Asquith [I]. Jensen and Ruback [14J. and Shad [18] on premiums
paid to selling stockholders over the pre-merger value of their shares. Dodd (7]
notes further that the evidence on returns to bidding firms is far from conclusive
but that most work repons average abnormal returns close to zero, an indicatio~
that the "lion's share" of the gains from a merger transaction are earned by target
firm shareholders. Additionally. he ,tale\ that these "broad statistical averages"
hide the fact that merger announcement, arc accompanied by a surprising number
of bidding firm stock price declines (a., many as 40 percent of the companies
in ~ome studies). Ellert (9) found that poorly performing firms tended to be targets
for acquisition. Elgers and Clark [8) and Asquith and Kim [2] among others have
approached the association between acquisition performance and acquisition
strategy. To date there has been no study of the stock market's initial response
to what would later be called a good or bad merger. In other words. there has
been no examination of security return, around the announcement date of mergers
which would subsequently be deemed successful or unsuccessful by various
sources.
Data and Mcthodolog)

The sample set of good and bad merger, "as gathered from two sources: Fortune's "The Decade·, Worst Mergen," [ 12] and Bminess Week's "Do Mergers
Really Work'!" [5). The Fortune merger\ were ba.,ed on a survey of three dozen
merger and acquisition specialist.,. The Bw,incss Weck transactions were selected
by staff writer.,. The criteria used to evaluate merger ,uccess included the profitability of the combined entity. shareholder returns in the years following the
merger. and market share changes. Tabli.: I lists 11 good mergers and 14 bad
merger~ extracted from the,e .,ources and include, the aequirer. the acquiree,
and the Wall Street Journal announcement date. The sample was cleansed by
studying news reports for each firm both prior to and after the announcement
date to insure that ne11,s of the merger was not public.:ly available before the
announcement and that no other ,1gnificant event, were occurring at these firms
during the analysis period . Un.,uuable firm\ 1,1,ere discarded from the sample.
It should be noted that many of the good merger, in Table I are in the high
technology sector and many of the poor mergers arc energy related. This could
affect the results if there is a prevalent market psychology towards rewarding
or penalizing merger~ in thc,e ,ectors.
The method employed in analyLing acquiring firm stock market returns
surrounding the announcement of the merger wa, residual analysis. This techni·
que is useful in isolating abnormal returns ari,ing from a specific event, such
as the announcement of a merger. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) (11).
in a landmark anicle, used the cumulative average residual technique to examine
the adJUStment of stock prices to new information . The legitimacy of this approach
has been well supported by Brown and Warner [3,4], among others. In consonance
with this procedure, 60 months of return data were gathered for each of the ac·
quiring firms in both the good and bad merger categories. These data were
collected two months prior to a 31-trading day "window" encompassing disclosure
10

Table I
Sample Mergers

Successful
Acquirer
United Technologies
LTV
Dayton-Hudson
HcmL
Umted Technologie5
Burlington Northern
United Technolog1e~
Conagra
American Expre5~
Nabisco
Allied Corp.

Acquiree

Anno uncement Date

Otis Elevator
Lykes
Mcrvyn·5
Weight Watcher,
Carrier
St. Loui,-San Francisco
Railway
MoMek
Banquet Food,
Shcar\on. Loeb. Rhoadc,
Standard Brand,
Bendix

3/30/76
11/7/77
1/ 24/78
515178
9/19/78
9/26/78
9/28/79
9 16/80
4 22/81
4/ 23/81
9 23/82

Unsuccessful
Acquircr

General Electric
Mobil Corp.
ARCO
Pan American
AMOCO

EXXON

Schlumberger
W1ckc5
Warner-Lambert
Westinghou5e Electm·
Standard 011 (Ohio)
Fluor Corp.
Baldwin-Umtcd
Me Ke~son Corp.

Acquirec

Utah lntcrnatronal
Marcur
Anaconda
National
Cyprus Mme~
Reliance Electric
Fa1rch1ld
Gamhle-Skogmo
IMED Corp.
Teleprompter Corp.
Kennecott Copper
St. Joe Mincrab Corp.
MGIC
SKU Inc.

II

Announcement Date

12/ 16/75
3/15/76
3/ 17/76
9 8 78
4/ 12/79
5121/79
5/ 22/79
12/ 12/79

6 8/80

10116/80
3/13/81
4/ 2/81
12/15/8 I
10 24/83

--of the merger {15 days on either side of the announcement day plus the announcement day).
The 60 months of return data for each acquirer and the corresponding 60 months
of returns on the Standard and Poor·s 500 Index were used to estimate the
parameters of the market model described by Fama 110):
(I)

where
Rjt
a·
1
b
J
Rmt
ejt

= the return on the jlhsecurity in month I (j = l .25;t = 1,60),
= the intercept term for the jlh ~ecurity.
= the regression coefficient for the jlh ~ecurity.
= the re1urn on the market index {S&P 500) in month t. and
= the error term for the jlh ~ccurity in month t.

In order to estimate abnormal return~ during the 31-day "window" period for
each of the 25 firms in the total ~ample. equation (2) was employed:
(2)

Where
ARjt

the abnormal return on the J'h security on day t (j = 1.25;
-15 .. ,0, .. + 15).
= the actual return on the jlh on day t,
= the market model intercept parameter from equation (I) for the jlh
security,
b·* = the market model regression coefficient parameter from equation (I)
J
for the jlh security. and
= the actual return on the market index (S&P 500) on day t.
t=

Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) were determined for the "Window"
pcrio<l by summing ARj 1s acrm~ firm~ in the entire sample. the successful merger
group. and the unsuccessful merger group anJ then dividing by 25, 11, and 14,
respectively. The cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) for each of these
three ponfolios was calculateJ on a daily basis during the 31-day announcement
period by incrementally summing group AARs. In the absence of abnormal performance. the expected value of both AARs and CA Rs is zero. If the market
is able to differentiate between succe~sful and unsuccessful mergers. then the CAR
for the unsuccessful merger ponfolio should fall significantly below that of the
~uccessful merger portfolio. This does not imply that the market is smarter than
management in determining which mergers are likely to succeed. This only
assumes that the stock market is able to recognize value when it is created, such
as when two assets have a greater combined earning power than when they operate
~ingly. A two-tailed t-test was conducted in order to test this hypothesis.

Results
The cumulative average abnormal returns for the full sample, the group of successful acquirers, and the group of unsuccessful acquirers, are presented in Table
2. Interestingly, in absolute terms, the findings are different than expecte-0. The
12

Table 2
Cumulative Average Abnormal
Returns For Acquiring Firms
Day

Total

-15
-14
-13
-12
- II

0.000
-0.006
-0.0IO
-0.013
-0.008
-0.003
-0.007
-0.010
-0.014
-0.015
-0.01 I
-0.005
-0.006
-0.001
-0.003
-0.007
0.000
- 0.006
- 0.002
- 0.009
-0.007
-0.004
-0.007
- 0.010
-0.01 I
-0.006
-0.007
- 0.01 I
-0.007
-0.006
-0.Ql l

-IQ

-9
-8
- 7

-6

-5
-4
-3
-2
-I

0
2
3

4

5

6
7
8

9

10

11
12
13
14
15

Unsuccessful

Successful

0.000
-0.006
-0.012
-0.015
-0.004
0.004
-0.007
-0.012
-0.013
-0.018
-0.011
-0.005
-0.0IO
-0.001
0.002
-0.006
0.006
0.000
0.005
-0.002
0.000
0.008
0.012
0.006
0.005
0.013
0.013
0.006
0.012
0.012
0.004

0.000
-0.005
0.008
-0.009
-0.014
-0.01 I
-0.007
-0.009
-0.014
-0.01 I
-0.0IO
-0.006
-0.001
-0.001
-0.011
-0.009
- 0.008
-0.014
-0.012
-0.019
-0.016
-0.018
- 0.031
-0.031
-0.032
- 0.030
-0.033
-0.033
-0.030
- 0.029
-0.031

CAR for the entire sample of acquiring firms is negative on day + 15 following
the merger announcement. At the same time, the + 15 day CAR for the unsuccessful merger portfolio is slightly positive while that for the successful merger
portfolio is negative. These results are shown in Figures I and 2 as plots of incremental CA Rs over the "window" period for the complete sample and the successful versus unsuccessful acquirers.
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Cumulative Abnormal Performance
Full Sample
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Figure I. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns:
Full Sample.
It i~ important to note that none of the re~ult~ cited above were statistically
~1gmfican1. At the 95 percent confidence level, the end-of-period CAR for the
total ,ample "a~ not significantly different from zero (t= .018). The same finding
held true for the subsamples. Neither the CAR of the successful mergers (t=
.102) nor the CAR of the un~uccessfuJ mergers (t= .120) were statistically different
from zero. Finally, there was no significant difference between the end-of-period
CAR for the successful and the unsucces~ful mergers (t= .810). Additionally,
the plots of cumulative abnormal performance m Figures I and 2 indicate only
minor deviation~ from zero throughout the whole 31-day announcement interval.
Thi~ outcome requires mterpretauon. As stated at the outset, the eventual success
or failure of a merger "ill depend on a variety of factors. The strategic rationale
for the merger. the price paid by the acquiring firm (and the resulting wealth
transfer). the ~moothness of the post-event integration process, as well as chance
occurrence~ of both a positive and negative nature subsequent to the combination
all play a role in determining the ultimate efficacy of an acquisition. This paper
addre~ses only the initial react10n of the stock market to the news of me~gers
which were. with hindsight, judged successful or unsuccessful by the_bus~ess
media and other analysts. In a completely efficient market, investors will swiftly
14
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Figure 2. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns:
Successfu l and Unsuccessful Acquirers.
employ all available information to evaluate the potential succc,s of a merger
and. through the market process. value the participants' securities accordingly.
Thb ,tudy's findings ,howed hnle impact or discrimination in this valuation
proces,.
The experiment described above produced a counterintuitive result. The early
stock market reaction to the announcements of the decade·, worst mergers was
not statistically different from the reaction to disclosure of the decade's best
mergers. This finding could reflect several phenomena. It i, possible that the
market is simply unable to discriminate between what will be good or bad mergers
at their inception. This inability may be based on an incomplete information set
or a lack of understanding of the factors affecting merger performance. An
alternative interpretation could be that the market will eventually revalue the
acquirers' stocks, but the process is slower than would be observable over the
six-week trading period surrounding the merger announcement. The reasoning
behind this explanation involves the speed with which ensuing information concerning the merger's impact on the company reaches the market. Positive and
15
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negative fallout from the acquisi_tion may come to light only over an extended
term. Consequently. the revaluation proces!. may take place on a piecemeal b •
.
fl
Uij
over rnonths or even year:-.. T his may re ect the difficulties in integratin the
organizations of two ~parate firms into one operation. Some authors sugges~lhai
the impediments arising from a lack of organizational fit between the two paT111e
may be as severe a, problems arising from a lack of strategic fit [13). The seven:
of such obstructions may become apparent only after a sustained period of time.
A further consideration in explaining why. even in the case of the very best
and worst ~ergers. the ~1arket does not initially produce substantially differing
return~ he~ m the potential effect of later event~ on the acquisition. It is possible
that subsequent, and in all likelihood unpredictable, circumstances play a dominant part m determimng the ultimate ,ucl·ess or failure of a merger. This is a
somewhat disturbing hypothesis. for it calls the value of strategic planning for
mergers into question.
Condw,ions
Th,:-. stud) has exammed the stock market reaction to announcements of mergm
which later proved to be extremely \Uccessful or unsuccessful. Previous research
mto merger announcements includes evidence that inveMors generally reduce the
value of an acquiring firm·s stock during the period following the announcement.
This study contributes to this area of research by mvestigating whether the market
discriminates between mergers which ultimately succeed and those which fail.
The results described above indicate that the market did not significantly differentiate between the decade ·s best and worst mergers. This could indicate that either
msuffic1ent information exists at the time of the announcement to evaluate the
prospects for :-.ucces~ or that the market has no model with which to make such
an evaluation. The role of later chance evenb is abo likely to be significant in
determming merger performance. The 1mplication of this finding is that stock
price movement, in re,pon~e to merger announcements must be interpreted with
extreme care.
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